Cessna 421C N421TP accident near Carson City, Nevada

Probable cause

Airport personnel’s failure to properly prioritize their response actions, including updating the airport’s automated weather observation system recording in a timely manner to notify incoming pilots of a runway closure, which resulted in an airplane striking an immobilized airplane on the runway during landing at night. Contributing to the accident was the airport’s inadequate emergency response plan.

NTSB analysis

The pilot was conducting a return flight at night to his original departure airport on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Before departing he checked the weather at his destination and the Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and there were no restrictions to returning to the non-towered airport.

After the pilot departed for his destination, a second pilot landed at the destination airport after business hours. That pilot lost control during landing and that airplane slid off the side of runway 27 and came to rest with the left wing partially blocking the runway. That pilot contacted flight service (FS), who notified the airport manager of the blocked runway and issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) that the runway was closed. Airport personnel were contacted to respond to the disabled airplane and a resident near the airport was contacted to monitor the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and notify any inbound aircraft that the runway was closed.

The first airport employee to arrive at the airport proceeded to the disabled airplane so he could transport the pilot and his dog to the airport terminal. After they returned to the terminal, a second airport employee arrived. The first employee and the pilot then returned to the disabled airplane to take photographs. The second employee remained at the terminal to watch the pilot’s dog. Airport personnel did not immediately update the Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS) recording to warn incoming aircraft of the runway closure or put closed runway lighting in place on the runway.

While enroute, the pilot checked the weather and AWOS and there were no warnings of the runway closure at his destination. Due to the reported weather and because there was not an instrument approach approved for night use at his destination, he instead changed his plan and route of flight to fly an instrument approach to a nearby airport to use it as a waypoint, then cancel IFR once he was below the weather and continue the flight to his original destination under visual flight rules(VFR). The pilot did not inform air traffic control (ATC) of his plans, nor was he required to, so they did not provide available NOTAM information that the runway was closed at his destination. The pilot flew the IFR approach, canceled his IFR clearance and proceeded to the destination airport under VFR as planned. The pilot rechecked the AWOS as he neared the destination airport and made a 10-mile position call on the CTAF.

The airport resident monitoring the airport’s CTAF frequency heard someone attempt to activate the runway lights and heard the pilot’s 10-mile position call. The resident attempted to contact the pilot on the radio multiple times, but did not receive a reply. Airport personnel, who had handheld and vehicle mounted radios, did not hear either the pilot’s or the resident’s radio transmissions.

The pilot did not hear any radio transmissions on the Unicom frequency warning of the runway closure and subsequently landed. He was unaware of the airplane blocking the runway until he hit it. The left winglet on the landing airplane had impacted the airplane blocking the runway, substantially damaging the landing airplane’s left aileron.

The airport’s emergency response plan did not provide for specific actions to be taken by personnel in the event of a non-accident runway closure event. The emergency response plan was updated following this accident with specific actions for personnel to take in the event of an aircraft accident or incident, including the issuance of a NOTAM and updating AWOS to advise of any closure or hazard at the airport. The airport manager stated it would take about 5 minutes for someone inside the terminal to update the AWOS.

The pilot made reasonable attempts to determine the status of the airport before landing. There was insufficient evidence to determine why the pilot did not hear the resident attempting to warn him of the runway closure. The accident is consistent with airport personnel not properly prioritizing their actions in response to the disabled airplane in order to prevent another airplane from landing on the closed runway.

Text from the NTSB. Open the NTSB docket for WPR24LA068 for the full record.